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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
In all industrialized countries the bulk of old age income provision results from
collective arrangements. Such arrangements can either be run on a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG)schemeorona fundedbasis. Theycanbe run aspublic schemes or thestate
can mandate private agencies to administer occupational and Wrm-based schemes.
All these collective forms of pension provision have in common that they may be
seen as the institutional expression of some form of solidarity as they all have
distributional implications that go beyond a mere actuarial redistribution of good
and bad risks. In Europe in particular, social solidarity is an important concept in
the debate over pensions.
In this chapter we discuss why and under what conditions people are willing to
share risks collectively and accept the resulting distributional implications. We
explore whether these conditions will change because of individualization, ageing,
and globalization. Will these trends erode social solidarity and therefore also the
institutional basis for sustaining pensions income?
As a Wrst step toward understanding solidarity as the social basis for collective
pension provision, the chapter starts with a deWnition of solidarity in general
(Section 2), exploring how this principle has found its institutional expression in
diVerent types of pension regimes. The chapter develops a broad analytical frame-
work for understanding the diVerent dimensions of social solidarity and in which
waythesediVerentdimensionsarelinkedtocollectivepensionprovision(Section3).
Clark and Munnel / The Handbook of Pensions 08-Clark-chap08 Page Proof page 141 15.12.2005 9:22amIn the course of history, solidarity has acquired a variety of meanings. For some
social solidarity has to do primarily with risk-sharing, for others social solidarity
equals redistribution. This distinction is intimately intertwined with accounts that
seektoexplainthedevelopmentdiVerentkindsofpensionschemes(Section4).The
theoreticalbuildingblocksofSections3and4willalsobehelpfulforthinkingabout
future changes in social solidarity (Section 5), and directions for future research
(Section 6).
2 Defining Social Solidarity
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Solidarity refers to networks of social relationships that involve mutual dependen-
cies, responsibilities, and entitlements within a deWned group of people or a
community. It is a structure through which fortunes and misfortunes are reappor-
tioned. In pre-modern societies, these networks were embedded in extended
families, in religiously integrated communities, in guilds, and in corporations.
Facing an erosion of these traditional institutions, governments have sought to
redeWne the networks of mutualsupport, and respecify the group inwhich fortunes
and misfortunes are redistributed.
It is diYcult to deWne the concept of solidarity simply and unambiguously.
Like so many central concepts in sociology, the term has acquired a variety of
meanings. On the one hand, this means that the concept has become ‘essentially
contested’: the meaning attributed depends upon one’s political or philosophical
orientation. On the other hand, it has been argued that it is precisely this multitude
of meanings that has allowed the concept to survive throughout history (Hayward
1959).
It is possible to distinguish two main interpretations of the concept: an individ-
ual and a collective interpretation (Spicker 1991). In both interpretations, solidarity
essentially comes down to an acceptance of responsibility for others. In the
individual interpretation, this acceptance is rooted in mechanisms that depend
upon mutual self-interest, whereas the acceptance in the collective interpretation is
seen as embedded in the social cohesion of the collectivity.
The individual interpretation approximates the pooling of risks as being mod-
eled by the risk redistribution paradigm, so there are some aYnities with the
notion of solidarity as advocated by rational choice theory. This perspective
assumes that people are only prepared to go beyond the one-sidedness of charity
and altruism if they have a vested interest in structuring a social solidarity that is
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interdependence’ (Baldwin 1990).
Philosophically, this form of solidarity has its roots in the liberal tradition and
was Wrst manifested in self-help initiatives, or ‘mutualism’ as Spicker describes it.
However, theintroduction of compulsory socialinsurance meantaclear breakwith
thisliberalheritageasthestateassumedanactiveroleinfosteringtherecognitionof
mutual interdependence. Social insurance pensions came to be distinguished from
private arrangements (i.e. those oVered by commercial insurance companies or by
mutual beneWt societies), in that they became politically generated. The state used
its legislating power to impose statutory arrangements that applied to certain
categories of the population of a country or sometimes even to the entire nation.
In practical terms this meant that insurance became compulsory (initially only
for certain segments of the working class, later for all wage-earners, and ultimately
for most people in gainful employment), and that it placed the costs not simply
in terms of the insurance of the risks covered, but to some extent in accordance
with the ability to bear them. The social element in social insurance thus in part
depends upon the extent to which the orthodoxy of actuarial logic is transcended.
But even under compulsory social insurance, people only support others who
support them. Those who are unable to contribute to the pooling of resources
(e.g. a typical workers, migrants, long-term unemployed, housewives, people with
disabilities, etc.), are either excluded altogether, or at best, they are included on
inferior terms.
The mutualistic pattern of solidarity produces a horizontal redistributionwithin
a group of people who are subject to the same types of risk. Such horizontal
redistribution implies, for example, that groups are diversiWed according to occu-
pation and income diVerentials. The higher contributions of higher income groups
are used only to grant higher beneWts for those groups. The lower contributions of
low income groups severely limits the level of their beneWts, and those lower strata
thereforeoften end upwith an inadequate coverage of the risks they are exposed to.
A mutualist system of solidarity thus generally leads to fragmented and stratiWed
social welfare programs.
The collective interpretation of social solidarity, on the other hand, has aYnities
with Emile Durkheim’s conception of solidarity and can be adequately captured by
the metaphor of ‘fraternity’. Under this form of solidarity, people are expected to
support one another because they are equal members in the same community.
With the development of nation-states, this membership came to be deWned in
terms of citizenship. Thus in the modern age fraternal solidarity came to manifest
itself in the form of a social security system based on citizenship entitlements.
Under such a system all citizens are covered on the same terms by a comprehensive
national beneWt system. Solidarity as fraternity leads to a vertical redistribution
that goes from the rich to the poor, and from high risk groups to low risk groups.
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to increase the level of the beneWts for high-risk and/or low income groups.
Solidarity as fraternity should be clearlydistinguished from altruism. Both imply
a generosity toward the unfortunate that, in contrast to mutualist solidarity, does
not rely on the expectation of reciprocal kindness. Both are motivated by empathy
toward persons who belong to a disadvantaged group. But whereas in the case of
altruism, the personal characteristics of the targeted individuals are the central
driving force behind this empathy, for fraternal solidarity they are not an issue
(Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2003).
As Glazer (2000, p. ix) notes, only the Wrst two principles of the French
revolution—freedom and equality—have received the wholehearted support of
Americans. Fraternity and solidarity are not familiar terms in American political
rethoric. As a possible explanation for this, he points to the presence of a large
racial minority that was kept in slavery and kept down by prejudice and discrim-
ination. One can also point to the fact that the US population never experienced
the kind of devastation of savings and property brought about by two world wars
in Europe, which created a solid foundation for solidaristic arrangements. This
does not necessarily imply that there are no solidaristic elements in the American
pension system, though it should be noted that collective pension provision plays a
smaller role in old-age income provision in the United States as compared to
Europe.
3 Solidarity and Pensions
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Social solidarity can be deWned as the willingness to share risks collectively and
accept the resulting distributional implications. In this section we look Wrst at the
risks being shared in old-age income provision and the reason why this might be
done collectively. Subsequently, we examine the factors determining the distribu-
tional consequences of collective risk-sharing.1
3.1 Solidarity and Risk-Sharing
Individuals who seek to provide for themselves in retirement are faced with two
types of risks: income and longevity. Both risks are manifested at the micro and
macro levels. At the micro level the income risks are to some extent endogenous in
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course (Shiller 1998). Longevity risks involve uncertainties both regarding each
individual lifespan, as well as regarding future trends in average mortality. But
at the micro level, this risk is far more exogenous than the income risk. The macro
risks are by deWnition of an exogenous nature. Table 8.1 identiWes a number of
these risks.
To some extent, individual lifespan risks can be insured in the private market.
But without government regulation imposing fair annuities and mandatory par-
ticipation, the resulting form of solidarity will at best resemble a highly fragmented
form of mutualist solidarity and will be limited to that section of the population
with a minimum level of income. Moreover, this subset of the population will be
segmented into a multitude of narrowly delimited risks categories to which vastly
diVerent premiums are charged. The contribution rates of life annuities are typic-
ally based on the remaining lifespan of an age-cohort to which the individual
belongs. As men and women, for example, diVer in life expectancy, insurance
companies end up diVerentiating between, in this case, low-risk men and high-
risk women when setting contribution rates.2 Adverse selection problems may
further prevent the development and sustainability of voluntary mutualist
schemes, as individuals will be better informed about their life expectancies than
insurance companies and insurance companies will be confronted with the fact
that their customers live longer than the reference population as a whole.
The main economic risks in pension Wnance, whether the micro risk of wage
path or the macro risks of the real rate of return and stability of purchasing power,
cannot be insured via the market (Ponds 2003).3 Some have argued that inter-
generational risk-sharing overcomes private market failures (Merton 1983).4
Table 8.1 Risks facing individuals in retirement
Income Longevity
Micro individual wage path the risk of having a
non-standard employment career with
resulting fluctuations in earnings
individual lifespan: the risk of living longer
than average
Macro investment returns and economic growth:
uncertainty about the resources that will
be available to finance pension claims
purchasing power: uncertainties about the
development of wage levels and prices once
a cohort enters retirement
average mortality and fertility: uncertainty
regarding the future old-age dependency
ratio: how many pensioners will there be
in relation to the working population? The
development of the old-age dependency
ratio is determined by average mortality
and fertility
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respect to factor rewards: wages and rental income (Gordon and Varian 1988).
Long-term wage risk and rental-income risk are not diversiWable within an age-
cohort because these risks aVect individuals of the same age simultaneously. But as
in the long run wage income and rental income are negatively correlated, it would
be possible to accomplish welfare improvement by sharing both risks between
generations. Intergenerational solidarity thus would make it possible to exchange
the human capital of young workers in the form of wages, and the Wnancial capital
of pensioners in the form of savings. Solidarity would thus take the form of an
income redistribution from high rentalincome to lowwage income, and vice versa.
3.2 The Distributional Consequences
What determines the distributional consequences of collective risk sharing? In this
context three factors5 can be identiWed:
. the risks covered;
. the way beneWts are determined;
. the constituency within which the solidaristic logic of risk redistribution
operates.
3.2.1 The Risks Covered
The extent to which micro and macro risks are covered respectively has intra- and
intergenerational distributional consequences. The vertical redistribution of in-
come within pension schemes that redistributes the micro income risks at the heart
of fraternal solidarity, tends to be conWned to public and mandated pension
schemes. Such schemes are often characterized by a number of deviations from
actuarial orthodoxy. These include provisions such as additional allowances for
dependents, and various Xoors or ceilings on beneWts and contributions (Disney
2004).6 Such deviations give rise to a vertical redistribution from high income to
low income. In contrast, the coverage of the individual longevity risk may result in
averticalredistribution fromlow income to highincome.In general, upper income
groups enter the labor force later in life and live longer after retirement, so that,
compared to low income groups, over a lifetime they contribute less and receive
more in schemes in which beneWts are independent of life expectancy (World Bank
1994). The overall intra-generational distributional consequences of the coverage of
microeconomic risk may therefore well be limited. The coverage of macro risks,
however, has by deWnition intergenerational consequences. The reapportionment
of macro risks depends on the way in which beneWts are determined.
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A typology developed by Musgrave to characterize various PAYG systems (Mus-
grave 1981) can be expanded to describe the way beneWts are determined. The
distinction between PAYG and funding, though, is only of secondary importance.
What matters more is (1) the contrast between deWned contribution (DC) and
deWned beneWt (DB), and (2) the way in which the beneWts are being deWned. Of
course, the decision to opt for orthodox funding precludes a DB formula, just as
PAYG cannot be reconciled with a true DC formula—in the end even a so-called
notional deWned contribution PAYG plan remains a kind of DB scheme that at best
emulates some of the distributional principles of a funded DC scheme. It is,
however, possible to distinguish four approaches toward setting beneWts, which
all have their distinct way of reapportioning macro risks:
1. Funded DeWned Contribution (FDC): in the case of an orthodox funded
deWned contribution scheme, there is hardly any sharing of macro risks
involved, as retirees individually have to bear the risks. Their individual
contributions determine their individual beneWts, and the costs of both
demographic changes and of economic Xuctuations fall on the retirees.
2. DB with Fixed Contribution Rate (FCR): the working population is required
to contribute a Wxed fraction of its income to support retirees. Taxes drive
beneWts and beneWts are the dependent variable. The costs of demographic
changes fall on retirees. A typical example of such an arrangement is the
notional deWned-contribution system of the reformed Swedish scheme.
3. DB with Fixed Replacement Rates (FRR): retirees are entitled to a given
fraction of their earnings plus an adjustment factor reXecting inXation,
productivity gains (wage indexation), and/or inXation (price indexation) in
the subsequent generation. Under such a system beneWts drive taxes and the
tax rate is the dependent variable. All costs (or nowadays less likely beneWts)
of demographic changes and economic developments fall on the contributing
generation. A typical example of such a scheme was the German statutory
pensions up to 1992 and the deWned-beneWt schemes that can be found in the
sector-wide pension funds of the second pillar in the Netherlands. As pen-
sions are related towages, the welfare of retirees is linked to productivity gains
achieved by the working population. In the case of price indexation, pen-
sioners will beneWt less from productivity increases but will be shielded from
possible economic decline.7
4. Fixed Relative Position (FRP): contributions and beneWts are set to hold
constant the ratio of per capita earnings of those in the working population
(net of contributions) to the per capita beneWts (net of taxes) of retirees. The
tax/contribution rate is adjusted periodically to reXect population and prod-
uctivity changes. As the population ages, tax rates rise, but beneWts also fall,
so that both parties end up footing the bill of ageing at the same rate. This
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seems to serve as a guiding principle of recent cost-containing reforms in the
German statutory scheme.
3.2.3 The Basic Universe of Solidarity
The third factor which determines the distributional consequences of collective
risk-sharing concerns the unit withinwhich the fortunes and misfortunes of life are
being redistributed. The risks can be reapportioned across several generations of
the population of an entire country (as is the case in general schemes such as
the basic pension in Denmark); it can be limited to the entire class of wage-
earners (as is the case in wage-earner schemes such the Belgian statutory pension
insurance); or it can be further limited to speciWc sectors of the economy (as is
the case with sector-wide pension funds in the Netherlands), or to speciWc occu-
pational categories (as was the case in the original myriad of schemes in the
corporatist Italian pension regime prior to the reform started in 2002). This
‘basic universe of solidarity’ is the group or the community which forms the
constituency within which the solidaristic logic of risk redistribution operates
(Esping-Andersen 1987). The members of the groups in question recognize their
obligation in this respect: each member can invoke the group’s solidarity as a
matter of principle.
3.2.4 The Governance of Solidarity
Funded DB schemes have in common with PAYG arrangements that, in contrast to
orthodox funded DC schemes, it is not the individual participant who has to bear
the macroeconomic and demographic risks, but the stakeholders of the basic
universe of solidarity. The crucial question here is which stakeholder is responsible
for closing the balance of the fund. In most corporate pension plans it is ultimately
the shareholders and employees of the sponsoring company who have this respon-
sibility, as back-servicing can lower future proWts, dividends, or wages and even
lead to job losses. In most public sector pension funds and industry-wide pension
funds, these risks are formally borne jointly by all the stakeholders: that is, the
shareholders and active participants of all the aYliated Wrms, and by the retirees.
Such diVerences are also reXected in the governance of solidarity. Most Anglo-
American corporate plans are run as a trust that is legally required to act in the
Wnancial interest of the current and future pensioners. Trustees are nominated by
management as representatives of the shareholders. Employees and retirees have no
inXuence on the governance of their pension fund. In some industry-wide funds,
such as the ones found in the Netherlands and Denmark, employees formally do
have a say in the decision-and rule-making.
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.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Explanations of social solidarity in pension schemes can be soughtat twolevels. On
the one hand, one can look at the level of individual motives, where one can try to
understand the conditions under which people are willing to accept the redistribu-
tive consequences of the reapportionment of risk. On the other, one can address
the issue at the level of institutions, where one can seek to specify how these
individual motives are being translated into a collective voice, and under what
conditions this collective voice in turn leads to formal institutions.
4.1 Individual Motives
To some extent, solidaristic redistribution is the result of the demands for diVerent
risk categories in societies confronted with various types of market failures,
including asymmetric information and interdependent risks, which may prevent
them from obtaining insurance through commercial channels. However, this
cannot explain majority support or the legitimacy of pension regimes in which
solidarity goes beyond a mere mutualist self-interest in redistribution. As Øverbye
has pointed out, given the positively skewed distribution of risks, the median risk
in a population is lower than the average risk (Øverbye 1998). But in a solidaristic
pension system it is the latter that forms the basis for determining contribution
rates. Persons with a medium risk may end up contributing far more than they
would do if they chose to take out an individual contract in the insurance market.
A number of complementary explanations have been advanced to explain this
paradox.
A Wrst set of explanations focuses on uncertainty, risk aversion, and myopia.
Both providers and potential buyers of insurance may be unable to assess the risk
they are facing. This is more likely to be the case if a society is subjected to random
shocks, such as wars or severe economic depressions, or in times of rapid social
changes, as such events increase the interdependence of risks, modify the risk
structure, and make it hard to foresee one’s future station in life. More generally,
common vulnerability and the uncertainty each individual faces about the likeli-
hood of ending up amongst the disadvantaged leads to a willingness to support
pension schemes that go beyond merelycorrecting market failures. Because of what
Rawls has referred to as the ‘veil of ignorance’, rational actors with little knowledge
about their station in life and impelled by a fear of misfortune are said to be
willing to conclude a ‘social contract’ that institutionalizes aid for the neediest
(Rawls 1971). This ‘veil of ignorance’ makes it possible to develop empathy for the
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(Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003).
Individual myopia can lead young people to give inadequate consideration to
their consumption needs in retirement and save too little. Decisions about making
adequate provisions for retirement diVer from other inadequate economic judg-
ments because they are being made at such an early stage in life. By the time people
discover their mistake they are no longer in a position to escape the consequences
and have a vested interest in continuing existing arrangements (World Bank 1994).
Such myopia can be oVset by compulsory inclusion in a solidaristic scheme, which
has the added advantage of functioning as a safeguard to protect prudent members
of a society against those who are imprudent and are tempted to bank on a means-
tested social minimum (Thompson 1998). Countries that seek to encourage more
mutualist forms of solidarity by means of excessive means-testing, thus often face
the problem of people close to retirement deliberately impoverishing themselves by
spending mostof theirsavings prior to retirementordonating their savings to their
children in order not to miss out on the means-tested beneWts (Binstock and
George 1996). On the other hand, it can be argued that most people tend to
overestimate their lifespan risks: in contrast to other social risks such as illness or
unemployment most people prefer to see themselves as belonging to a high-risk
category that lives longer than average. Finally, fraternal solidaristic pensions can
also be seen as a form of risk-sharing not only against one’s own longevity risk, but
as much against the risks of having parents who live longer than average and who
need to be supported by their children through an extended old age (Myles 2003).
A second set of explanations starts out from the idea that solidaristic redistri-
bution is embedded in notions of equity and justice (Baldwin 1990). Underlying
these notions are the social preferences of individuals: caring not only for the
resources allocated for oneself but also for the resources allocated to other relevant
reference agents. Until recently, these preferences were all gathered under the rather
imprecise term of ‘altruism’. Recent progress in experimental economics and
evolutionary biology has established the importance of these preferences and
contributed to understanding their nature, forms, and evolution (Bowles 2003).
Two types of social preferences seem to be specially relevant for understanding
social solidarity: reciprocal fairness and inequity aversion. It is important to note
that not everybody exhibits social preferences and it is likely that people in general
care more about others with whom they can in one way or another identify
through a shared religion, nationality, occupation, ethnicity, race, and so on
(Lindert 2004). DiVerences in the size of government redistribution in the United
States as compared to European countries have been linked to the degree of racial
heterogeneity and racial prejudice as these factors tend to increase the distance
between the poor and the rest of society (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Thus, whereas
Americans are said to believe that the poor are lazy, Europeans believe they are
unfortunate.
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Institutional explanations seek to understand how individual motives are being
translated into a collective voice, and under what conditions such a voice leads to
formal arrangements. Such questions become particularly puzzling whenever the
preferences that underpin those motives are heterogeneous, and it becomes diY-
cult to explain solidarity in terms of a clear-cut bilaterally advantageous reci-
procity. Majority support for extending solidaristic redistribution beyond mutual
self-interest has been explained in terms of the weight of elderly voters in the
population (Pampel and Williamson 1985). However, even though the relative
weight of the elderly population in the electorate does say something about the
salience of the pension issue, it cannot explain the extent of fraternal redistribution
between pensioners. Others have pointed to the extension of political suVrage and
a ‘logic of democracy’ that has allowed the class struggle to move from the
industrial context into the political arena (Hewitt 1977; Lindert 2004). This argu-
ment has been further developed by the so-called ‘power resources model’ that sees
solidaristic redistribution as the product of the struggle of a social-democratic
labor movement (Shalev1983). In some countries political movementsof the center
(such as Christian Democratic parties) have shared the fraternal redistributive
inclinations of social democracy, endorsing a mutualist interpretation of solidarity.
Added to this, are the eVects of World War II and the ensuing Cold War that
created a level of national solidarity, and catapulted the labor movement into the
center of political decision-making. More generally, it has been argued that social
security systems have been established or extended whenever an economy has had
to experience the eVects of an adverse event such as war or a depression, or when
the economy has experienced a high level of growth or anticipates future growth
(Blinder 1988).
Another set of explanations builds upon the idea of path dependency. Many
public pension plans originated in the 1930s and the Wrst decade after World War II.
They reXected the economic, social, and political conditions of that period, and
were Wnanced on a PAYG basis. The adoption of this method of Wnancing created a
cohort of retirees that received beneWts without having contributed to an earlier
generation of pensioners. This generosity led to inter-cohort transfers and has
created a ‘legacy debt’ (Diamond 2004). At the time, it was assumed that, given a
steady population growth, the PAYG model would make everybody better oV
(Samuelson 1958). However due to the fall in fertility and mortality rates, the
rate of return in the PAYG model has fallen below the capital market rate of return.
Several authors have shown that, even in the case of an unbalanced population
growth, a move from a PAYG system to a funded system cannot, in terms of
income, be a Pareto gain (Breyer 1989; Barr 2001; Sinn 2000). When a PAYG system
is introduced, the income gain of the privileged generations is exactly equal to the
capital value of the income losses to all subsequent generations. This result holds
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and the capital market.
5 Prospects for Pensions Solidarity
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Pessimism about the future for social solidarity is widespread: its basis is perceived
to be undermined by societal fragmentation, itself the consequence of increasing
individualization and heterogeneity resulting from immigration. In addition, it is
often argued that the twin pressures of an ageing population and globalization will
make social solidarity too costly to sustain. In this section we give a critical review
of the impact of these ‘mega-trends’ on social solidarity.
5.1 Individualization, fragmentation, and heterogeneity
In the socio-political debate on welfare solidarity, individualization and solidarity
are often seen as mutually exclusive and contradictory phenomena. The basis for
this view, which goes back to de Toqueville, is that individualism ultimatelyleadsto
egoism. However, a contrasted view would argue that the increase in the options
for individual choice strengthens responsibility and thus may well contribute to
solidarity (Arts and Verburg 2001). Classical sociology sees individualization not so
much as a process of dismantling solidarity, but rather as one that gives rise to
other types of solidarity (Van Oorschot and Komter 1998). Close and often
personal ties are gradually replaced by more abstract notions based on interde-
pendence, reciprocity, and equality. Given its secularcharacter, the question is what
is new in the process of individualization.
A relatively new trend is the decline in household size, in particular the growing
number of people living alone, often seen as made possible by the welfare state. It
has been argued that the breakdown of family bonds has undermined feelings of
reciprocity and solidarity. Even if we accept this, it might be argued that, because of
the growth of single-person household units, people Wnd themselves more depen-
dent on collective arrangements (Pierson 2001), which could strengthen the ‘selWsh’
motives for supporting solidaristic arrangements. This also holds true of another
aspect of individualization, namely the increasing demands for Xexibility in the
labor market and the erosion of the standard working career. Where people are less
able to count on a standard employment career, the building up of pension rights
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ments of the labor market more dependent upon a Wrst-tier pension with a strong
element of horizontal solidarity.
Thus, the arguments for believing that individualization will inevitably lead to a
decline of solidarity are not well founded theoretically. There is also little empirical
evidence that support for solidaristic arrangements is on the wane. For example, a
survey among people in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain found that a majority of
Continental Europeans supported existing collective arrangements, and were
strongly averse to the neoliberal social model (Boeri et al. 2001). Immigration has
become an issue in relation to support for solidaristic arrangements in most
European countries. The discussion, however, seems to concentrate on restricting
access to welfare to new immigrants; there are no signs that increased heterogeneity
in European countries is eroding support for collective pension provisions.
5.2 Ageing
By shifting the balance between younger and older generations, ageing has made
solidarity between the younger and older generations more costly. This applies to
PAYG and, more indirectly, to funded systems as well (Barr 2001). However, there is
no compelling reasons why this should lead to a break-up of solidarity. A logical
response would be to reapportion the demographic risk in such a way that the
burden for the youngest generations is reduced, while their relative position
remains the same. One obvious instrument for this is a gradual rise in the
retirement age (Myles 2003).
Early retirement schemes, in particular, tend to be actuarially highly unfair and
are based on redistribution from young to old, without the young being aware of
this. In the past such arrangements might have been legitimate, as younger
generations might also have beneWted from the labor market opportunities that
resulted from the reduction in the labour supply. However, it is likely that in the
future demographicchanges may well lead to a shortage of labor, and the argument
of making room for the young may no longer be convincing. More generally,
given the demographically induced increases in the cost of solidarity, a critical
review of all kinds of ‘hidden’ forms of redistribution in pension schemes is
required (e.g. from those with short-term or intermittent careers to those with
long-term careers in Wnal salary schemes). In addition, an appeal could be made to
intra-generational solidarity among elderly persons by taxing aZuent pensioners
more heavily and reconsidering the general character of tax breaks given to the
elderly (Bovenberg 2002).
Partly in response to their ageing populations, countries have reformed their
public pensions schemes. The question remains, however, whether these reforms
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wageindexation to price indexation. As aresult, the average net replacement rate in
the EU will fall from its present level of 74 percent down to 58 percent in 2050 (see
Van Riel et al. 2003). The move in some countries from a classical PAYG pension
scheme to a notional deWned-contribution scheme will lead to a fall in replacement
rates as the costs of demographic changes fall entirely on retirees (Oksanen 2004).
Moreover, these schemes are largely devoid of horizontal solidarity. They are less
likely to assure adequate pension beneWts for women, low-wage workers, and other
workers with irregular employment histories (Williamson 2004). It should be
noted that the consequences of these reforms are rarely spelt out by governments;
it is doubtfulwhether these consequenceswill Wt inwith existing notions of fairness
and be politically feasible given the increased proportion of elderly voters (Galasso
and Profeta 2004).
5.3 Globalization
The idea that increased economic integration will lead to a decline of the welfare
state rests on the assumption that social spending increases wage costs and will
pose a threat to the competitiveness of a national economy. This view has been
refuted in a number of studies (e.g. Castles 2004). One explanation is that social
expenditure premiums mainly aVect the composition of wage costs, and their level
is aVected to a much lesser extent. From this perspective, there is no compelling
reason to expect that social solidarity, in so far as it is expressed in levels of welfare
state spending, will become too costly, nor that globalization will have an eroding
impact on Wrst pillar pensions. Still, one could argue that changes in the compos-
ition of the socialwage, such as the abandoning of parity Wnancing in an attempt to
lower non-wage labor costs, can indeed reduce the solidaristic nature of the Wrst
pillar. This seems to be especially the case if unions lack the capacity to press for
higher wages across the board, and individual households are diVerently burdened
with footing the bill depending upon their income and occupational status.
The integration and re-regulation of global Wnancial markets might, however,
have an impact on supplementary pension funds. In company-based pension
plans, the sponsoring Wrm is usually held responsible for the funding position.
The funding risks are borne by the shareholders and the active employees of the
Wrm. With the advent of new global accounting rules, the former are no longer
willing to bear thoserisks, and the reported Wnancialposition of companies is likely
to become very unstable due to the volatility of pension funds’ assets and liabilities.
The new accounting rules will require pension liabilities to be booked using the so-
called ‘fair value basis’. Corporations will therefore seek to limit the impact of
pension fund risks on their performance and Wnancial position. One route is to
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index-linked bonds (Exley et al. 1997). Another route is to switch from deWned-
beneWtt od e Wned-contribution schemes. Such a transition implies a switch from
collective risk-sharing to individual risk-taking. This may well lead to an end to
solidarity in funded occupational pensions, at least when it comes to sharing
macro-level risks. This trend will be reinforced by closing down deWned-beneWt
funds in the United States, a process which has been going on for some time (Clark
2003). Shareholders might increasingly demand that European Wrms emulate the
new American standards of minimizing pension risk to safeguard the Wnancial
position of the companies they have invested in. The change in occupational
pensions will set limits to the attempts in countries like the United Kingdom to
shift old-age income provision from public pensions to occupational pensions by
gradually discounting public pensions (Pensions Commission 2004).
6 Conclusions
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Solidarity in old-age income provision is rooted in a combination of market
failures, social norms, risk aversion, myopia, and path dependency. We therefore
expect social solidarity never to disappear altogether. However, because of the
‘mega-trends’ discussed in Section 5 it is likely to be redeWned, as has already
happened several times in the past. Such changes occur mainly as a reaction to the
erosion of existing institutions. The framework we presented in Section 3 might be
helpful in analyzing and predicting the directions of these changes: the risks that
are covered; the way beneWts are determined; and the constituency within which
the logic of solidarity operates. We conclude that the integration and regulation of
global Wnancial markets will, in combination with an ageing population, make it
harder to cover macroeconomic risks via occupational pension plans. Will soli-
darity in this respect therefore be more limited to the Wrst pillar? The way beneWts
are determined will change primarily as a result of population ageing. Here a new
balance of burden sharing will have to be found between the young and older
generations. Given social norms of fairness and the increased proportion of elderly
voters, we remain skeptical about the ability of government to gradually lower net
replacement rates as a way of limiting the budgetary costs of ageing.
Future research may lead to a better understanding of why people show solidar-
ity, how solidarity might change, and what the eVect of this will be on old-age
income provision. The relationship between the insurance and distributional
motives needs further exploration: do people accept distributional consequences
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motives important in their own right, because they are rooted in notions of
fairness? For a better understanding of the forces driving changes in solidarity,
more should be known about diVerences over time and between countries with
respect to the risk covered in old age, the rules for determining beneWts, and the
constituency within which the logic of solidarity operates.
Cross-national diVerences in old-age poverty rates; and the extent to which such
diVerences are related to the type of solidarity that is embedded in a country’s
pension system are issues that will inform future policy development. Related to
this, more research would be welcome on the micro-empirical consequences of
various pension designs on the re-apportionment of macroeconomic income risks
and of macro-longevity risks, that is, to identify the categories of persons that
eVectively shoulder the burdens of macroeconomic Xuctuations and of an ageing
population. The re-apportionment of the risks related to pension income will
remain a hotly debated issue in the years to come. A better understanding of social
solidarity will be essential for the quality of this debate.
Notes
1. For some authors social solidarity has to do primarily with risk-sharing and therefore
equals social insurance (e.g. Disney and WakeWeld 2004 for the British context), while for
others social solidarity equals redistribution and is conceptually diVerent from social
insurance (e.g. Rosanvallon 2000). In accordance with the double dimension of solidar-
ity discussed in Section 2, we think that social solidarity is about both collective
insurance and redistribution. Moreover, these cannot be seen as independent from
each other because an important motive for collective insurance might be to avoid
the distributional consequences of insurance through the market; social insurance has
distributional consequences. Finally, if one adopts a Rawlsian perspective, vertical
redistribution can be seen as a form of lifetime income insurance.
2. Some countries prescribe unisex mortality tables. Thus the low-risk male population is
forced to cross-subsidize the high-risk female population. However, this may be seen as
being a consequence of a larger social contract: women generally bear the costs of men’s
inferior physical endowment in the form of additional care provision as their husbands
grow older (Myles 2003).
3. The private market fails to provide insurance products based on intergenerational risk-
sharing. The reason for this is straightforward: current and future generations are not
both alive prior to the outcome of the income risks. The current young generation is not
able to pre-commit the future young generation, although from an ex ante perspective
both generations may beneWt. Whenever the current young generation of workers wants
to commit itself to an insurance contract, the other party to the hedge is not born. By the
time the next young generation is able to commit to the contract, the ex post outcome of
the contract will be known. The support of the future young generation will be
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contract that will lead to a loss of welfare for them.
4. Merton (1983) points to the role of a public scheme in improving diversiWcation of
lifetime income resources. Because human capital is non-tradable, individuals are forced
to hold too much of their wealth in human capital in relation to Wnancial capital, that is,
retirement wealth, while on retirement all capital is only available as Wnancial capital.
Merton shows that a public pension scheme in which retirees are entitled to a share of
current-wage income, and the young are taxed accordingly, provides diversiWcation
of income risk across wages and proWts and increases welfare by improving the eYciency
of risk-bearing in the economy.
5. It should be noted though that pension schemes often contain redistributive elements
which are hidden for participants (such as redistribution from dual wage-earner families
to single wage-earner families, or from young workers to older workers to early retire-
ment schemes) and which might on closer scrutiny be considered ‘unfair’ by most
participants (World Bank 1994).
6. The degree of vertical redistribution of social security programs is usually measured in
terms of the extent to which diVerences in replacement rates correlate with income and
work histories. The underlying assumption is that in an orthodox actuarial scheme,
contributions are proportional to past earnings and employment tenure. In countries
where replacement rates decline as the earnings and tenure enjoyed in the past rises,
pension schemes come closer to representing the fraternal ideal of solidarity. In contrast,
countries with a public scheme in which beneWts are more linked to past income and
employment tenure, vertical redistribution is less and the model of solidarity comes
closer to the mutualist pattern. Whereas the Wrst group of countries (e.g. Denmark, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) is often called Beveridigean, the
second group (e.g. Germany, Italy, and France) is associated with Bismarck, but this
nomenclature seems to have lost much of its classifying power as:
. most countries with a Xat-rate public scheme developed earnings-related
occupational pensions etc. private or state mandated supplementary ar-
rangements; those arrangements can either be voluntarist or state man-
dated, but are almost always encouraged by tax beneWts and have for most
wage-earners resulted in an income package that is similar in its equivalence
to the packages typical of Bismarckian schemes (e.g. the Netherlands);
. many countries with a public scheme that might have been Bismarckian in
origin, over time implemented a numberof Xoors and ceilings, on either the
beneWt or contribution side, that have dramatically blurred the equivalence
of the scheme and have resulted in a decline of the replacement rate with
income that is similar to the one found in Beveridgean-type schemes (e.g.
Belgium);
. even in countries in which the public pension scheme exhibits a high degree
of equivalence (i.e. replacement rates scarcely change with income), the
leveling eVect may be accomplished through other branches of the transfer
system—most notably the social assistance scheme for which eligibility
conditions have been liberalized for the elderly (e.g. Germany).
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inherent in the factor rewards that are related to Xuctuations in the rate of population
growth. This type of risk can result in the bad luck of being born into an unusually large
cohort or of being retired when the younger cohorts are unusually small, because these
large cohorts are confronted with relatively low wages as well as a relatively low rate of
return on their savings. A social insurance contract between the retirees and the workers
with Wxed beneWts will be beneWcial from an ex ante point of view. A Wxed beneWt system
has the eVect of creating net transfers in lifetime income from lucky (small) to unlucky
(large) generations (Smith 1982).
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